The Study of Protest Politics in Eastern Europe in the Search of Theory by Kubik, J & Ekiert, G
 1 
Grzegorz Ekiert (Harvard) and Jan Kubik (UCL) 
 
The Study of Protest Politics in Eastern Europe in the Search of Theory 
September 21, 2016 
Draft chapter for Adam Fagan and Petr Kopecky, eds. Routledge Handbook of East 
European Politics, 2018. 
 
Please do not cite or quote without authors’ permission. 
 
 
Spectacular and sometimes tragic in their consequences, waves of contention have 
swept Eastern Europe since the end of the Second World War with remarkable regularity. 
From the initial armed resistance through manifold forms of everyday disobedience to 
spectacular outbursts of rebellious anger, the people of Eastern Europe have periodically 
challenged reigning regimes. Protest under communism came from oppressed and 
voiceless social groups challenging powerful authorities through weakly institutionalised 
mobilisations that in turn provoked extremely repressive responses from the state. After 
1989, protests have become routinised, highly institutionalised and organised by political 
movements and civil society organisations. Today, contention is a constant feature of 
post-communist politics generating a high number of significant protest events. 
 
Western theory of contention and protest politics in Eastern Europe 
 
There is a large, diverse social science and history literature on protest, contention 
and oppositional activities in Eastern Europe both before and after 1989. We review the 
scholarship on the later period, focusing in particular on its theoretical trajectory. The 
goal is to identify and briefly characterize the main stages in the development of the 
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literature on protest in Eastern Europe and to trace down mutual influences between this 
literature and theories of contentious politics developed in the Western social sciences. 
There are four distinctive stages in the scholarly literature on post-1945 protest in 
the region. They correspond roughly to the four historical phases of contention. A series 
of early rebellions against the new communist rule across the region constitutes the first 
stage. Largely descriptive analyses of this period are interspersed with theoretical strands 
inspired by the idea of totalitarianism and some elements of collective behaviour and 
mass society theories (Zinner 1962, Baring 1972, Lewis 1958). 
The second phase is marked by the emergence of dissident movements, counter 
hegemonic discourses and open political opposition, rooted in the defeat of communist 
reformers of the Prague Spring and made possible by the Helsinki Accords of 1975.1 The 
rise and defeat of the Solidarity movement in Poland was its central event. Scholars 
studying the second phase at that time (and often later) rely mostly on case studies and 
employ several broad interpretative approaches popular in the social science of the 
period: historical and political sociology, political anthropology, and critical Marxism 
combined with the resurrected concept of civil society (see also Cisar in this volume). 
Their work is informed by a broad liberal stance centred on the idea of pluralism and 
inalienable human rights and freedoms. 
                                                        
1 The Helsinki Accords (or Helsinki Final Act) were signed on 1 August 1975, at the 
conclusion of the first Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. They 
legitimated the post-Second-World-War borders of Europe. The 35 signatory states 
(including the Soviet Union and all its satellite states, except Albania) agreed, inter 
alia, to respect human rights and basic political freedoms. From that point on, the 
Soviet Bloc governments had a much more difficult time suppressing political 
opposition (dissident movements) that would invoke the Accords when faced with 
persecution. 
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The revolutions of 1989-1991, treated here as the third phase in the history of 
post-1945 contention in Eastern Europe, were massive upheavals across the entire region 
leading to the collapse of communist regimes, the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, and the 
emergence of new nation-states. These revolutions immediately attracted scholarly 
attention and have never ceased to fascinate scholars representing various disciplines and 
theoretical orientations (Ash 1990; Mueller, Gehler, and Suppan, eds. 2015; Eisenstadt 
2015; della Porta 2014), including the practitioners of game theoretic approaches to 
contention (Kuran 1991, Lohmann 1994, Opp 1994). Existing analyses range from micro-
level studies of protest participation to sweeping accounts of regional dynamics of 
contention, and there is a bifurcation between studies of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the overthrow of communist regimes elsewhere. 
Finally, in the fourth phase, stretching from 1989 to today, the entire range of 
contentious behaviours characteristic of modern political regimes have appeared. 
Researchers who study this period come from all disciplines and employ all theoretical 
and methodological approaches of contemporary social science, with its classic division 
between rationalist, institutionalist, and culturalist schools of thought and use all 
contemporary theories of contention (Lichbach 1995, 1998; McAdam et al 1996). As 
contention in the region has become normalised so have ways of studying it. 
Thus, until the end of 1970s, the study of contention in Eastern Europe was 
largely disconnected from Western theories of social movements, revolutions, and protest 
politics. Communism was considered to be a system sui generis, its politics unique, and 
best understood through the prism of a totalitarian paradigm. While most of the earlier 
works are to a large degree descriptive in nature, some of them echo distinct theoretical 
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claims derived from the theories of collective behaviour (Smelser 1963), mass society 
(Kornhauser 1959), or totalitarianism that were influential roughly up to the mid-1960s.  
During the 1980s but particularly after 1989, the field of study of East European 
contention expanded rapidly, as several distinct patterns of contention, characteristic of 
the increasingly divergent sub-regional situations, have emerged. Data and research 
opportunities have become widely available and all major theoretical orientations 
proposed in the field of contentious politics have made their appearance. Some authors 
have embedded their empirical work within other theoretical frameworks, including 
critical Marxism, comparative politics, historical and political sociology, or political 
anthropology (Ost 1990, Bernhard 1993, Ekiert 1996, Kubik 1994). At the same time, a 
new wave of scholars (mostly younger historians from the region) has entered the newly 
opened archives and proposed novel, sometimes revisionist, historical analyses of the 
past and current cases of protest (McDermott and Stibbe 2006, Paczkowski 2003, 
Kamiński et al 2004). 
 
Revolutions of 1989 and 1991  
 
The revolutions of 1989 came largely as a surprise, yet the intensity of surprise 
varied amongst scholars (Tarrow 1991). Those who observed Poland and the activities of 
underground Solidarity were arguably less startled, as they studied the country where an 
accumulated legacy of rebellions had earlier culminated in the Solidarity movement 
(1980-1981) and where, since 1981, manifold clandestine activities had periodically led 
to eruptions of open protest (Ash 1983, Bernhard 1993, Cirtautas 1997, Ekiert 1996, 
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Kubik 1994). The 1988 wave of strikes, that constituted the decisive factor pushing the 
communist authorities to enter a path of negotiations (Paczkowski 2015), did not 
materialise spontaneously; it was preceded by years of patient organising and massive 
clandestine work on cultural, political, and even economic levels (with underground 
publishing houses and networks of distribution). 
The literature on 1989 is thus divided into two strands. The more prominent one 
continues the tradition of earlier approaches to contention in the region 
(descriptive/historical and interpretative). Its theoretical competitor draws on the 
approaches to contentious politics that are inspired by game theory. Historians, 
historically minded sociologists and political scientists, and journalists are most 
influential in the literature on Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, where the 
revolutionary wave of protest in 1988-1989 came as the culmination of years of 
contentious challenges to the communist monopoly of power, often emanating from the 
domain of culture. These writers emphasise historical legacies and reconstruct long-term 
trajectories of resistance and rebellion, but primarily provide detailed accounts of 
multiple oppositional activities by the Polish Solidarity or the Czechoslovak Charter 77 
and a constellation of organisations associated with them. The widely read works range 
from witness accounts (Ash 1990, Gwertzman and Kaufman 1991) to more systematic 
and comparative accounts (Banac 1992, Stokes 1993, Joppke 1995, Stark and Bruszt 
1991). This tradition of analysing the 1989 revolutions as a complex social and cultural 
phenomenon with long historical roots continues not only among historians (Kenney 
2003; Pleshakov 2009; Sebestyen 2010; Mueller, Gehler, and Suppan, eds. 2015), but 
also among social scientists (Eisenstadt 2015, della Porta 2014).  
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On the other hand, for the students of other countries, particularly East Germany, 
where the end of communism is usually associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
element of surprise and rapid mobilisation have become phenomena needing explanation. 
It is no wonder, therefore, that this literature is dominated by models designed to explain 
individuals’ calculus to join or not join the unanticipated but rapidly rising tide of 
contention. 
However, the studies written within the rationalist paradigm are not uniform. 
They differ in their choice of concepts, issues, modelling techniques, and the robustness 
of empirical verification. For example, Kuran (1991) offers a model based on the 
modified assumptions of the rational choice school in which he distinguishes between 
private and public preferences (the latter are “for show”) and analyses the dynamic of 
simulating support for the unwanted regime that he calls preference falsification (hiding 
private preferences). Once the first challengers publicly express their discontent “there 
comes a point where [one’s] external cost of joining the opposition falls below his 
internal cost of preference falsification” (1991: 18). This is a person’s “revolutionary 
threshold.” As a growing number of people cross their individual thresholds and join a 
“revolutionary bandwagon,” the protest wave gathers strength. But in addition to 
individual calculations, Kuran emphasises also the mobilising power of internal and 
external factors that are beyond actors’ control (for example, the Gorbachev’s 
liberalization) that served as triggers setting off the revolutionary bandwagon, mostly in 
East Germany. 
Karklins and Petersen (1993) set out to “explain how individual citizens made 
their decisions to demonstrate against their powerful governments, … why the regimes 
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failed to suppress the demonstrations, and … why the process occurred so rapidly and 
thoroughly” (1993: 588). To answer these questions, they build a model of strategic game 
played by the people and the government. What is particularly important in the model is 
that the “masses” are not seen as an homogeneous entity, but rather as a set of distinct 
groups, dissidents, students, workers, and party supporters, each of which has a different 
tipping point beyond which its members are ready to demonstrate (assumption very 
similar to Kuran’s). Individuals’ calculations of protection and prediction (for example, 
the probability of the regime’s fall) are central to their model of the situation construed as 
an n-person assurance game. The models are then tested with empirical data from 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, and China (a negative case). 
Lohmann produced a detailed study of several waves of mobilization mostly in 
Leipzig, East Germany, using painstakingly collected empirical evidence and a 
sophisticated “dynamic threshold model [that] interprets a sequence of mass protest 
activities as an informational cascade” (1994: 49). Similar to Kuran and Karklins and 
Petersen, she emphasizes the significance of heterogeneity within the set of potential 
protesters. In her conceptualisation there are four categories, ranging from anti-status quo 
extremists to pro-status quo extremists. Lohmann manages “to show that individual 
participation decisions may depend on changes in aggregate turnout over time because 
people extract benefit-cost information from turnout numbers” (1994: 91). 
Opp (1994, 1998) offers the fourth influential rational choice model that he tests 
by using survey data. The central puzzle that drives the analysis does not concern the 
protest participants, but rather the actions of the tyrannical regime. Opp asks why the 
powerful and oppressive regime failed to prevent the challenge in 1989, and why it had 
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been successful earlier. The main tool such regimes rely on is repression, and Opp shows 
that its impact on the probability of protest is not linear; the intensification of repression 
may actually encourage people to protest under certain circumstances. To argue this, and 
in contrast to other rational choice scholars, Opp and his colleagues (see Opp, Voss, and 
Gern 1995) assume that incentives such as public goods incentives, moral incentives 
(“moral indignation”), and social incentives (social pressure within friendship networks) 
matter, under certain circumstances, in mobilising people for collective protest action at 
least as much as selective benefits. One of the key findings of this study is that the 
perception of the changing political environment in the Soviet Bloc had a powerful 
influence on the potential protesters (1994: 129). 
While rational choice explanations (CARP) are prominent in the literature on 
1988-89 in East Central Europe, works belonging to another research program, Synthetic 
Political Opportunity Structure (SPOT) are increasingly present as well.2 These include 
the authoritative study on the role of protest in the breakup of the Soviet Union by 
Beissinger, who – relying on the method of event analysis – produced an exhaustive 
study “on the role of the contentious event in the politics of nationalism” (2002: 11) and 
the way the nationalist mobilisations contributed to the collapse of the Soviet system. 
Gorenburg (2003) used this approach to analyse minority ethnic mobilisation in the 
Russian federation, Glenn (2003) to examine 1989 in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and 
                                                        
2 Since the 1970s, two research programmes have come to dominate the field of study on 
contentious politics: Synthetic Political Opportunity Theory (SPOT) and Collective 
Action Research Programme (CARP), as they were dubbed by Lichbach (1998). SPOT’s 
dominant tenor is structuralist and historical (its leading scholars are Tilly, Tarrow, and 
McAdam), while CARP focuses on individual decisions and relies on rational choice and 
game theory. See also Lichbach (1995). 
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Vladisavljević (2008) to determine the contribution of popular mobilisation to the fall of 
communism and the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
 
Post-1989 contention: empirical access, theoretical embarrassment of riches, and 
diverging regions 
 
Freedom of research that followed the fall of state socialism has attracted to the 
region scholars from all corners of the social sciences. They expanded the disciplinary 
range of the study of East Europe and often engaged in productive collaborations with the 
earlier generation of area studies scholars. In what has become a multi-stranded literature 
on the post-1989 protest politics of the region we detect three approaches that had earlier 
helped to interpret contention in Eastern Europe.3 First is the line of thought indebted to 
critical social science, inspired by Marxism. It has produced studies on labour unions and 
working class protests, and on the “losers” of post-communist transformations more 
generally. The second broad school belongs to comparative politics, as it focuses on the 
role protest plays in the consolidation of post-communist political regimes and on the 
interaction between institutionalised and contentious forms of politics. Scholars 
belonging to the third group study bottom up, popular mobilisation among specific 
groups and sectors of the post-1989 society, ranging from ethnic minorities, ecologists, to 
women and LGBT people. Their work is often anchored in the tradition of political and 
historical sociology, and political anthropology. 
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Critical social science 
 
Researchers continuing the tradition of critical social science often study what 
may be called a puzzle of low working class contentiousness. Why do workers in post-
communist countries, often experiencing detrimental changes in their professional and 
private lives, not protest more vigorously? There are several explanations. Greskovits 
compares Eastern Europe and Latin America, observes that the transformations in the 
former were accompanied by less violence and contention, and concludes that the main 
reason for that East European “patience” is that: 
“Communism left behind societies lacking in the structural, institutional, and cultural 
factors associated with violent collective action. The lack of extreme income inequality, the 
smaller number of marginalized poor, the relatively lower degree of urbanization of the 
population, and the absence of recent, violent experiences with coups and riots may all 
have contributed a stabilizing influence under post-Communism” (1998: 85).  
Vanhuysse emphasises a different set of factors to explain the relative quiescence 
of workers: high levels of exit into the informal economy, the decline of unionised jobs, 
the ineptness of union leadership, ideological “delusions” (such as the attraction of 
illiberal and populist ideas), but primarily well-designed governmental strategies of 
“divide and pacify” (2006: 137). 
Crowley, Ost and their colleagues argue that the main cause of labour weakness is 
its “own anti-union ideas, or what might be called a crisis of class identity, that 
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contributes powerfully to union weakness” (2001: 7) and see this crisis as a legacy of 
state socialism, under which labour unions functioned mostly as “transmission belts” of 
communist party power. Bohle and Greskovits (2012) dispute some of the conclusions in 
Crowley and Ost (2001), particularly that unions in Southeastern Europe were created “as 
weak actor.” They argue that in many cases they started relatively strong and only 
weakened over time (2012: 184-191). Ost (2005) develops the argument about Solidarity 
activists “betraying” their unionist identity, replacing it with nationalistic and religious 
ideology and in the process losing their effectiveness as labour’s champions. 
Sil’s “second generation” argument (2014) is that labour in Eastern Europe is not 
particularly weak and the unions are not inconsequential (after the initial decline), though 
their influence varies across the region. He offers a complex, context-sensitive 
explanation for the difference in the effectiveness of labour unions in Poland and the 
Czech Republic, and concludes that in the latter the unions are less divided and more 
successful in defending workers’ interests because they form more effective alliances 
with left-wing parties. Wenzel (forthcoming) studies labour union activities in Poland, 
particularly their protest actions, and – much like Sil – concludes that the unions have had 
significant influence on the course of post-communist transformations in that country. 
Ashwin (1999) examines the relative quiescence of the Russian working class. 
Beissinger and Sasse (2013), who studied the massive protest wave that swept the 
post-communist countries after the crisis of 2008, ask whether the end of this patience is 
coming. They refer to the relative quiescence of the labour class in post-communist 
countries. They conclude that it is context-dependent: “In Tolstoyan fashion, those 
‘happy’ countries that continued to experience economic growth in the midst of global 
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crisis were all little affected by protest, while those ‘unhappy’ countries that experienced 
significant economic contractions were all ‘unhappy’ in their own ways, displaying quite 
varied protest responses to economic decline” (2013: 363-364).  
Comparative politics: regimes, institutions, and contention 
 
The literature in this area can be usefully grouped into four, occasionally 
overlapping, strands. They include studies of: (1) contentious politics in new democracies 
(including right-wing contentious challenges to liberal democracy and protests against 
democratic backsliding), (2) the role of protests in semi-authoritarian and authoritarian 
states, (3) “colour revolutions”, and (4) contentious dimensions of ethnic politics. 
There is a group of post-communist countries that at some point began negotiating 
membership in the EU and eventually became members of this elite club, and made the 
best progress on the path of democratisation. Most work on these countries concentrates 
on top-down mechanisms of change, such as institutional reforms, the emergence and 
evolution of political systems and political parties, and the political economy of 
transformations. Studies of bottom-up mobilisations have been far less common. Building 
on an assumption that protest is a legitimate mode of political behaviour in a democracy, 
Ekiert and Kubik (1998a, 1999) propose a systematic study of the role of bottom-up 
contention in the consolidation of democracy in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and former 
East Germany. Their method is event analysis based on systematic data collection from 
newspaper sources, often used by the scholars working within the SPOT paradigm. Other 
scholars of contention and democratisation studied the role of “corrective” bottom-up 
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protests in Bulgaria (Ganev 2014), Romania (Margarit 2016) or, comparatively, in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania (Margarit 2015, see also Szabó 1996). 
Democratic backsliding in the new EU member states has recently attracted 
scholarly attention, also among scholars of contention. The problem, observed at least 
since least 2008, is particularly pronounced in Hungary where the right-wing populist 
parties – often relying on mass mobilisation – have challenged liberal democracy 
(Krasztev and Van Til 2016). The rise of right-wing populist movements in Eastern 
Europe and the increasing visibility of their contentious actions is captured in the large 
comparative project, “The Logic of Civil Society in New Democracies: Hungary, Poland, 
South Korea and Taiwan” (Greskovits, Várhalmi and Wittenberg 2013; Ekiert, Kubik, 
and Wenzel 2013). Using the method of event analysis, Płatek and Płucienniczak (2016) 
conducted a detailed study of Polish right-wing protests in 2003-2014. More generally, 
right-wing mobilisation in the region is well documented in several collections, Kopecky 
and Mudde (2003), Melzer and Serafin (2013) and Langenbacher and Schellenberg 
(2011). These works analyse a broad range of organisations in several East and Central 
European countries, though they did not study protest actions per se.  
The second distinct body of work is devoted to the study of protest politics in 
countries where political transformations stalled and the outcome has been more or less 
repressive authoritarianism. Here, the dominant problem areas include periodic outburst 
of discontent, most famously colour revolutions (discussed as a separate phenomenon 
below), protest actions directed against the abuses of electoral process (electoral protests) 
and de-democratization, and protest under authoritarian regimes. Bunce and Wolchik 
(2011) study 11 electoral episodes in nine countries to comparatively examine the 
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electoral model of democratic transition in mixed (hybrid) regimes. They do not focus on 
protest per se, but examine its role as the major factor of political change, alongside and 
in interaction with elections. Their work examines also the role of diffusion, also of 
protest repertoires, in challenging non-democratic regimes (particularly in Bunce and 
Wolchik 2010). Several influential works focus explicitly on the role of protest in hybrid 
regimes (conceptualised often as competitive or electoral authoritarianism). Robertson 
(2007, 2010), using the method of event analysis and relying partially on his own 
database constructed from the daily reports prepared by the Russian Interior Ministry, 
builds a densely textured analysis of the Russian case (during three periods: Yeltsin, 
1997–2000, the first Putin term, 2000–2004, and the second Putin term, 2005–2008). He 
generalises that within hybrid regimes “variations in protest patterns are likely to be 
driven by three key variables: organizational ecology, state mobilization strategies, and 
elite competition” (2011: 6). Specific combinations of the values of these three dummy 
variables account for eight specific patterns of contention (2011: 204). For the students of 
mixed regimes, including Russia, the most important finding is that in such regimes 
“competition is less something that authoritarians have failed to eliminate, but rather 
something that they consciously allow and try to control (2011: 217). Lankina and 
Voznaya (2015) study “multiple protest arenas” in a large hybrid regime state (Russia) 
and demonstrate that regional variation influences both the intensity of protest and the 
type of demands. Greene (2014) shows the post-communist system in Russia increasingly 
relies on “disconnecting” the political world of the elite from society. Russian society is 
not suppressed, but rather it is just made irrelevant, since the state/government/elite has 
managed to form a system in which it is relatively isolated from “bottom-up” pressures of 
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protest. The society is not as passive as it is portrayed in most standard studies; it is active 
but the system’s configuration prevents this activity from being effective. Smyth (2014) 
and Smyth et al (2015), building on their original database (including interviews with the 
protestors), analyse the competing mobilisations (and narratives) of Putin’s opponents 
and supporters, often clashing in the streets after the December 2011 presidential 
elections. Smyth, Sobolev, and Soboleva (2013) study the manufactured mobilisation of 
Putin’s supporters and its political impact. 
Two books deal with the periodic outburst of protest in the most authoritarian 
post-communist states. Navumau (2016) studies “the Belarussian Maidan” of 2006 in a 
rare study of protest in the most oppressive regime in Europe. He provides a detailed 
account of what transpired, but also an original interpretation, partially driven by an 
effort to assess the applicability of Western models to the specific realities of post-Soviet 
Belarus. Radnitz (2010), in a book “subverting” the chief idea of James Scott’s influential 
study (1985), shows that protest in Kyrgyzstan was to a large degree manufactured by a 
part of the elite that achieved influence over some segment of the populace through a 
mechanism he calls “subversive clientelism.” 
The literature on colour revolutions, a fascinating cross-national protest wave, 
deserves to be discussed as a distinct strand. The 2000 “Bulldozer Revolution” in Serbia 
was the first in a series of revolts against new authoritarian rulers in the region. As in 
other cases, the success was predicated on massive mobilisation of civil society and its 
coordinated actions (Bieber 2003). Revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and 
Kyrgyzstan (2005) followed. Their origins, mechanisms, and consequences have been 
interpreted and explained in several ways. Wilson (2005) offers a description and day-to 
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day analysis of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, while Onuch (2014), comparing this 
revolt with the Argentinian upheaval of 2001, provides a comprehensive history of 
Ukrainian revolts since 1920, develops her own theoretical frames inspired 
predominantly by SPOT, uses her own multifaceted database, and as a result is able to 
“map” a very comprehensive picture of the revolution. Hypotheses derived from the 
SPOT program are mixed with several CARP ideas in Beissinger’s analysis of the 
Orange Revolution (2013). Relying on the results of two surveys, he shows that the 
revolutionaries in Ukraine (as in Tunisia and Egypt) were not driven by a strong 
commitment to democratic ideals; rather, people with disparate preferences formed 
“negative coalitions” and their actions were “fueled predominantly by extreme rejection 
of the incumbent regime, with no dominant, overarching grievance” (2013: 17). For 
Tucker (2009), who works within the CARP paradigm, the free-riding dilemma is one of 
the central concerns. He argues that the most important factor that helped to overcome 
this dilemma in Ukraine and trigger mobilisation was information about vote-rigging. 
Lane (2009), by contrast, believes that most people assumed that the information about 
the rigged elections was manufactured (2009: 132). Lane focuses also on “democracy 
promotion” that he sees as a misguided strategy, because counter-elites use the ideology 
of democracy to win power from incumbents, not to justify and underpin democratic 
reforms. He also confirms a widely accepted view that while relative deprivation 
predisposes people to rebel, it is not a sufficient cause of insurgency (2009: 125). 
Beissinger (2007) sets out to determine whether the external (such as diffusion of 
ideas and democracy promotion) or internal factors (that is, structural conditions and elite 
behaviour) are more important in triggering “modular” revolutions and in increasing the 
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probability of their success. He convincingly demonstrates that while the power of 
example can help to overcome adverse structural conditions and trigger protest, the 
success of the revolt is more difficult to achieve if favourable internal, structural, and 
institutional factors are not properly aligned. Beissinger mixes elements of SPOT and 
CARP, as he models the impact of both structural factors and mobilisation thresholds, 
calculated by the elites, to model the shape of protest waves. Way (2008) gives primacy 
to structural factors (political opportunity structure in SPOT’s terminology) emphatically 
in a study in which he tries to explain differential successes of various colour revolutions. 
The fourth subset of works in comparative politics deals with national and ethnic 
mobilisations that often take highly contentious forms. Beissinger’s seminal work (2002) 
set the standard for this body of literature. Building on his own sophisticated theorising of 
the relationship between structure and agency (firmly embedded within the SPOT 
tradition) and a painstakingly collected protest event database, he argued that although 
the collapse of the Soviet Union was caused by a complex set of factors, the dominant 
role was played by contentious events that accumulated over time and ultimately 
overwhelmed the ostensibly unmovable power structure. In a study that also relies 
heavily on the SPOT analytical apparatus, Gorenburg (2003) examines four ethnic 
republics of the Russian Federation and shows that the success of bottom-up nationalist 
mobilisation does not depend on the existence of propitious economic conditions, but is 
rather brought about by the strengthening of ethnic loyalties by “friendly” institutions that 
are often provided by the state. Stroschein (2012; also in this volume), another 
practitioner of SPOT, observes that the literature on the rise of ethnic politics and ethnic 
mobilisations does not always articulate with the field of study of contentious politics. 
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She sets out to rectify this problem and relying on her own database (built by protest 
event analysis) she studies contentious actions of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and 
Romania to demonstrate “how ethnic protest served to incorporate Hungarians into 
polities in which that are permanent minorities, by providing an extra-institutional means 
for them to confluence policies…” (2012: 10). 
 
Sociology of discontent: protests of the excluded 
 
This literature, anchored in the historical and political sociology, is concerned 
with identifying, understanding and explaining patterns of mobilisation per se, and 
assessing their role in politics though not always explicitly their impact on regime 
consolidation. The studies belonging to this strand deal predominantly with contentious 
politics driven by identity issues, ranging from religion to sexual orientation. Members of 
many social groups and categories struggle for the full recognition of their identities and 
interests and/or protest against the high costs of transformations, unjustly – in their 
judgment – impacting their members. There are works on protests by farmers (Foryś 
2008), women (Regulska and Grabowska 2013), environmentalists (Fagan and Carmin 
2011), homeless and urban activists (Jacobsson 2015), and sexual minorities (Vermeersch 
2006, Holzhacker 2012, O’Dwyer 2012, Sperling 2014; O’Dwyer in this volume). Some 
scholars have focused on the study of left-wing (often radical) movements and their 
weakness in post-communist Europe, for example, alterglobalists (Piotrowski 2013). 
 
Summary 
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Collective protests and contentious mobilisations have been permanent features of 
East European politics since 1945 to the present, although over time they have changed 
considerably. There are four distinct periods in the evolution of contentiousness in the 
region: (1) mostly spontaneous rebellions against the imposition of communist rule and 
policies of the new regimes; (2) the period of reforms and opposition movements lasting 
from the Prague Spring in 1968 until 1989, with the Prague Spring and the rise and 
suppression of the Solidarity movement as its dominant events; (3) the 1989-1991 
revolutions that involved widespread contentious mobilisation, contagion and diffusion, 
and enormous range of protest strategies from peaceful demonstration to bloody civil 
wars; and (4) the post-1989 period, characterised by the “normalisation” of contention 
shaped by diverging regime types, spanning the entire range from consolidated 
democracies to various forms of authoritarian rule.  
In this review we did not set out to present protest and contentious mobilisation in 
Eastern Europe, but rather to reconstruct the evolution of approaches used to describe, 
interpret, and explain contention. We focus in particular on the post-1989-1991 period 
characterised by an impressive diversity of interpretative and explanatory strategies. 
Inspirations of critical Marxism are clearly reflected in the continuing interest in the 
absence of class-based mobilisation and weakness of the left-wing radicalism. The 
second broad research programme belonging mostly to comparative politics is 
preoccupied with the role of contention in democratisation and authoritarian backsliding, 
while the third strand focuses on patterns of mobilisation related to social cleavages and 
identities. While many studies of contention in the region are descriptive and interpretive, 
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there is an equally significant body of work employing more “positivistic” explanatory 
strategies focused on identifying causal mechanisms and based on large, systematic, and 
comparative data sets.  
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